Articles Posted in Personal Injury

tractor trailer.jpgAdopted in 1920, Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468, 86 So. 629, 637 (1920). As expressed in Southern Cotton Oil:

[O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.

Over the years, the doctrine has been applied to golf carts, trucks, buses, tow-motors and other motorized vehicles. Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla: Supreme Court 1984); See, e.g., Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas, 145 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).

Does the doctrine apply to trailers that make up the semi, tractor-trailer rigs so common to our highways? To the surprise of many, including some lawyers, the answer is No. See Saullo v. Douglas, 957 So.2d 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Pullman v. Johnson, 543 So.2d 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Edwards v. ABC Transportation Co., 616 So.2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
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By its decision in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Company (Case no.: SC08-2269; opinion issued on April 21, 2011), the Supreme Court of Florida has declared that car rental agencies, unlike regular citizens and other businesses, are not vicariously liable for accidents involving the vehicles they own. Score one for big business!

Rafael Vargas was rear-ended and injured in his car by a rental vehicle owned by Enterprise Leasing Company. Vargas sued Enterprise for personal injuries on the theory of vicarious liability. The trial court dismissed the case and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judge’s decision, inviting the Supreme Court to answer a question certified to be of great public importance:

DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(b)2, FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)?

The Supreme Court accepted the invitation and answered the certified question in the affirmative.

At the urging of the Bush Administration, in 2005 the Republican-controlled Congress enacted the Graves Amendment. Proponents of the federal law sought to immunize rental agencies from laws in the various states which held them financially responsible for injury and death caused by their vehicles. One of those laws is/was Florida Statute Section 324.021(9)(b)2. Opponents argued that the Graves Amendment did not preempt the Florida statute. Hence, the stage was set for Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Company.
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Whether a person injured on real property owned or controlled by another will be successful in bringing a claim for damages, depends in large part on the injured person’s status on the property at the time of the accident. The general categories and the duty owed under each are set forth in the following outline:

  • Public Invitee. A person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public. (Example: Child in a public park.) This landowner has the following duties: (1) to correct or warn of dangers that the owner knows or should know of by the use of reasonable care, and which the visitor cannot or should not know of by the use of reasonable care; and (2) to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. (See my previous blog on this subject.)
  • Business Invitee. A person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land. (Examples: A grocery story patron; a paying fan at a Miami Dolphins football game.) Duty: same as for Public Invitee.
  • Licensee By Invitation. A social guest. Duty: same as for Public Invitee.
  • Uninvited Licensee. A person who chooses to come upon the premises solely for his or her own convenience without invitation either expressed or reasonably implied under the circumstances. (Example: teenagers partying in a parking lot owned by a business establishment.) Duty: To refrain from willful or wanton injury (e.g., to remove any concealed “traps” of which the owner has actual knowledge).
  • Trespasser. A person who enters the premises without license, invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, or at his own convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity. Duty: same as for Uninvited Licensee.

Independent contractors injured on the premises do not fit squarely within any of these categories. As a general rule, one who hires an independent contractor is not liable for injuries sustained by that contractor’s employees in their work. As the Supreme Court observed in Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.1973): if the owner is a passive nonparticipant, exercising no direct control over the project, he cannot be held liable.

A second line of cases bars the claims of independent contractors whose injuries were sustained while performing the independent contractor’s specialized work. In Morales v. Weil, 44 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the contractor was hired to demolish a barn with a roof damaged by two hurricanes. The damage was obvious and included a hole through the roof that was visible to the employees. However, in the course of the work one of the employees fell through a weakened roof panel and was injured. The Fourth District reviewed the applicable law and affirmed a summary judgment for the barn owners. The Court concluded that “the [owners] were in no better position than the [injured contractor employee] to assess the level of danger that the job posed. Consequently, the [owners] owed him no duty to maintain the roof in a reasonably safe condition.” Id. at 179.
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vehicle rollover.jpgVehicles like the Ford Bronco II, Ford Explorer and 15-passenger vans are designed with an unreasonable risk of rollover. Although there are many things manufacturers can do to prevent rollover accidents, rollover accidents will occur in vehicles considered safe. Knowing this, manufacturers should implement safety features designed to limit rollover accident injuries.

Although rollover accidents constitute 1.74% to 6.3% of all accidents depending on the type of vehicle involved, they account for 33% of all serious injuries and death.

Amazingly, the federal government does not require manufacturers to conduct rollover accident testing. The consequence of this is a gap in knowledge in how best to prevent rollover accident injuries and many vehicles lacking available equipment to optimally protect occupants in a rollover.
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Florida premises liability law is the body of law which makes the person who is in possession of land or premises responsible for certain injuries suffered by persons who are present on the premises. It is a negligence-based system, meaning that responsibility is apportioned in accordance with fault. This is known as the concept of comparative fault. See Florida Statute 768.81, entitled Comparative fault.

Under this system, the jury is charged with determing fault among the plaintiff, the defendant, and others who may not even be parties to the lawsuit. The jury must also place a monetary value on the damage sustained by the plaintiff. These two findings make up what is known as the [jury’s] verdict.

A jury verdict is not the same thing as a final judgment. Only judges render final judgments.

In rendering final judgments, judges consider a variety of factors. The jury’s findings regarding fault and damages are two of the most important factors.

A simple example, without consideration of any factors other than the jury verdict, will illustrate how the system works: Assume that Mr. Jones, a visitor to a friend’s condominium, trips on a large crack in a poorly lit underground parking lot while walking into the building. He falls hard to the ground, landing on his chin and head, sustaining a severe laceration and a concussion. Fire Rescue is summoned and he is transported to the hospital. The building and lot are controlled by a condominium association that has hired a management company to maintain the premises. It is learned that the large crack has existed for years and caused many other accidents. Unable to settle his case out of court, Mr. Jones sues the condo association and the management company for negligence. The jury returns a verdict in the amount of $500,000, but apportions fault at 75% (condo. association/management company)/25% (Mr. Jones). Based on the concept of comparative fault, the final judgment for Mr. Jones will be $375,000, or 75% of the total damages found by the jury.

Until 1973, Florida applied the law of contributory fault in all negligence cases. Under this concept, the plaintiff would be barred from any recovery if it was determined that he or she was at fault in any way, even only 1%. In our example, this would mean that Mr. Jones, although only 25% at fault, would receive nothing for his injuries.
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avis.jpgOur law firm (along with co-counsel firm Domnick & Shevin, LLP) is currently involved in litigation against the Enterprise car rental company.

In 2008, Enterprise rented a vehicle, in Miami, to a person whose Florida driver’s license was under suspension for failing to appear in court on a number of motor vehicle moving violations. After his credit card was rejected, forcing him to leave the rental agency to obtain cash, he returned with the cash and presented a facially valid (although unlawfully obtained) Texas driver’s license to the rental agent. Enterprise rented him the vehicle.

A few days later, the renter caused a high-speed rollover accident in the Enterprise vehicle on I-75 near Gainesville, Florida. Our client, a passenger in the vehicle, was airlifted to Shands Hospital with life-threatening injuries. She remains severely disabled, in great pain, and unable to work.

A quick and inexpensive (less than $1.00) Internet database search, based on name and birth date, performed by the Enterprise agent, would have disclosed the customer’s license suspension and traffic record. However, since the agent was not instructed or authorized by Enterprise to perform such a search, one was not done.

We sued Enterprise on the theory that it negligently entrusted its vehicle to the at-fault driver. Enterprise claims that it did nothing wrong.

What is Enterprise’s primary defense? Florida Statute 322.38(2).

322.38(2) provides as follows – No person shall rent a motor vehicle to another until he or she has inspected the driver’s license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented, and compared and verified the signature thereon with the signature of such person written in his or her presence.

Enterprise argues that 322.38(2) is a safe harbor provision providing it with absolute immunity from fault, that despite the ease and nominal cost of determining the prospective customer’s license status and driving record, its only responsibility to the public was to inspect the Texas driver’s license and compare and verify the signature thereon.

The Plaintiff’s (our client) position is that 322.38(2) is not a safe harbor provision extending absolute immunity to Enterprise or any other rental agency. Rather, it is a minimum standard established by the Florida Legislature to create some level of safety for those who travel on the streets and highways of the state, but it is not the only standard that can be considered by judges and juries to determine reasonable conduct under every circumstance.

It is simply not the Legislature’s role to instruct companies how to conduct every aspect of their business. Those business decisions are left to the judgment of the companies, with the understanding, however, that poor decisions or worse can result in serious legal consequences.

Such is the scenario in our case. Enterprise did nothing more than the bare minimum. A judge and jury will now decide if this conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. We do not believe that it was, thus our claim for negligent entrustment. Clearly, Enterprise could have done more.
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Fault (or negligence) is always an issue in Florida motor vehicle accident personal injury cases. For an individual to be successful in claiming damages against another party, the claimant has the burden of proving that the other party caused the accident.

In some cases, proving fault is an easy matter. In others, the issue will be hotly contested. In those cases, the plaintiff – the party seeking damages – needs evidence to prove her or his case. One place to look (for evidence) is in the traffic court records.

In most Florida motor vehicle accidents, an investigating law enforcement officer will issue a traffic infraction/ticket to one or more of the involved parties. The ticket can be an expression of the investigating officer’s opinion with regard to fault. For example, a driver may be ticketed for following too closely or for failing to yield the right of way.

Although the traffic infraction itself is not admissable as evidence of guilt in a civil case arising out of the accident, the defendant’s response to the traffic charge may be.

With a few exceptions, Florida Statute Section 318.14(4)(a) allows any person charged with a noncriminal traffic infraction to pay the civil penalty by mail or in person without the effective admission of guilt being used as evidence in any other proceedings. “[O]ther proceedings” includes a civil action arising out of a traffic accident.

For purposes of motor vehicle accidents, the most important exceptions to 318.14(4)(a) are contained in Florida Statute 318.19, which contains a list of traffic infractions requiring a mandatory hearing. Those infractions are:

  1. Any infraction which results in a crash that causes the death of another;
  2. Any infraction which results in a crash that causes “serious bodily injury” of another as defined in s. 316.1933(1);
  3. Any infraction of s. 316.172(1)(b);
  4. Any infraction of s. 316.520(1) or (2); or
  5. Any infraction of s. 316.183(2), s. 316.187, or s. 316.189 of exceeding the speed limit by 30 m.p.h. or more.

Unlike the allowance contained in 318.14, a guilty plea in one of the 318.19 exceptions can be used as evidence in any other proceedings, including a civil case for damages. (The record of the plea is admitted, not as establishing the fact [of fault], but as a deliberate declaration or admission of the party himself that the fact is true. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla., 1967).)
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law books.jpgIn my opinion, the most important Florida workers’ compensation case of all time is Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So.2d 84 (Fla., 2005). Aguilera made it clear that workers’ compensation insurance carriers and adjusters are not immune from being sued for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress where their conduct in handling a claim is more than simply bad faith or a breach of contract, but where the conduct is intentional and outrageous. What this means is that carriers and adjusters can be sued in circuit court for damages caused by outrageous conduct.

The Aguilera decision reinstated a lawsuit, which had been dismissed by a lower appellate court, the 3rd DCA, brought by an injured worker against the workers’ compensation carrier and claims adjuster. Although a confidential settlement was reached in the case, word on the street is that the case settled for in excess of one million dollars. Given the damage caused by their outrageous conduct, this was a small price to pay.

This Florida Supreme Court decision has gotten the attention of workers’ compensation insurance companies and their claims adjusters. No longer can claims be handled with complete indifference and a lack of regard for the health, safety, and welfare of injured workers without consequence. This is not to say that injured workers get everything they want. This is far from the case. There is still room for legitimate disputes. What the decision does mean is that there is no place in the workers’ compensation system for mean-spirited claims handling.

UNDERLYING FACTS:

  • On April 21, 1999, Aguilera was struck by a forklift and pushed against a pallet. He suffered immediate injuries and was rushed to the emergency room. Testing performed in the ER showed blood in Aguilera’s urine.
  • Subsequently, Aguilera began to complain of kidney and bladder pain.
  • On May 24, after two physicians examined him and concluded that he could not return to work, Aguilera’s attorney requested that he be examined by a board certified urologist.
  • The workers’ compensation insurance carrier denied authorization of the urologist, asserting that Aguilera’s injury was not work related.
  • On June 17, 1999, the insurance carrier was again notified that urological care was now needed on an emergency basis because Aguilera’s urine had begun to smell like feces.
  • On June 21, Aguilera was advised that his workers’ compensation benefits were being terminated as of July 9, 1999, notwithstanding the report of two doctors, including the opinion of the insurance carrier’s own doctor, that he should not return to work.
  • On June 25, 1999, the insurance company intervened and blocked Aguilera’s receipt of medication prescribed by the hospital emergency room doctor for his urinary condition.
  • On June 30, the carrier again denied authorization of emergency medical care for the urinary problems, claims it was not medically necessary.
  • On July 7, 1999, Aguilera’s treating doctor advised the carrier that his need for medical care was urgent and that his condition was deteriorating.
  • On July 9, 1999, the carrier’s own doctor issued prescriptions for various urinary tests.
  • On July 30, 2009, the adjuster intervened and simply unilaterally cancelled some of the medical testing.
  • Testing that was ultimately done revealed that Aguilera had a fistula, a hole in his bladder.
  • On August 6, 1999, Mippy Heath became the new insurance company case manager. She was specifically told by Aguilera’s attorney that she should have no direct contact with Aguilera. She also agreed that no intervention with Aguilera’s care would be attempted.
  • On August 19, Aguilera’s attorney alerted the insurance carrier that the injured employee was in need of emergency care for the fistula. Heath refused the authorization and insisted on a second opinion.
  • On August 25, Heath secretly appeared at the physician’s office for Aguilera’s appointment. She urged Aguilera to lie to his attorney that she has not appeared at his doctor’s appointment.
  • Subsequently, Heath insisted that Aguilera submit to the administration of invasive tests that were not only painful but also contraindicated by his then-present medical condition. The insurance company then proceeded to use Aguilera’s refusal to submit to the tests as a basis to justify a refusal and denial of his then needed critical, surgical treatment.
  • By November 4, 1999, Heath, the case manager, and a nurse practitioner also employed by the insurance carrier had changed positions and agreed that Aguilera needed immediate hospitalization for surgery. However, the insurance carrier’s adjuster again intervened and overruled the decision of medical personnel simply because he wanted a second opinion from a general surgeon. Notwithstanding this intervention, the insurance carrier did not follow its own position and authorize Aguilera to consult with a general surgeon, but instead again changed course and sent Aguilera to a gastroenterologist. At this point in time, Aguilera had allegedly been urinating feces and blood for over six months.
  • Aguilera’s ultimate surgery, the need for which had been diagnosed as an emergency as early as June of 1999, was not finally authorized or approved until March 22, 2000. By this time, according to the allegations, Aguilera had been urinating feces and blood for over ten months.

Florida’s workers’ compensation laws provide employees limited medical and wage loss benefits, without regard to fault, for losses resulting from accidental workplace injuries. The carrier’s failure to provide benefits in a timely manner or at all may result in the assessment of minor monetary penalites and interest. However, the workers’ compensation system does not have a mechanism for making carriers/adjusters accountable for serious injuries caused by outrageous claims handling.

In exchange for not having to prove fault for losses resulting from accidental injuries, employees have relinquished their right to seek common law recovery from the employer for those injuries. This concept is commonly known as “workers’ compensation immunity.” (See Florida Statute 440.11.)
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law books.jpgA statute of limitation is an enactment in a common law legal system that sets forth the maximum time after an event that legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated. Most people are familiar with the concept.

Far less familiar to the general public, and even to some lawyers, is the legal concept known as statute of repose. Like a statute of limitation, a statute of repose (sometimes called a nonclaim statute) limits the time period in which a civil action may be instituted.

A products liability case is a legal action for injuries founded on the defective design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property. Examples of products found to be defective are tires, motor vehicles, drugs, and surgical hardware. In Florida, defective products cases are subject to a statute of limitation and a statute of repose.

The statute of limitation in Florida with regard to injuries caused by defective products is four years. (Florida Statute 95.11(3)(e)). (Caveat: When death results from a defective product, Florida’s Wrongful Death Act imposes a two year statute of limitations.) This means that a lawsuit founded on a defective product must be filed within four years or two years of when it is known or should have reasonably known what caused the accident.

Sometimes, however, the statute of repose effectively limits the time allowed under the statute of limitation and, in some instances, bars altogether a claim from being brought.

An actual case example will help illustrate this point:

Our law firm was recently hired by a gentleman who was severely injured by a defective forklift. Through discovery conducted in his workers’ compensation case, we learned that the manufacturer originally sold the forklift in 1996, more than fourteen years before the accident.

Even though we were prepared to file a products liability complaint well within the two year statute of limitation period, we were prevented from doing so by the statute of repose.
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No type of insurance coverage is required to lawfully operate a motorcycle in Florida. The owner of a motorcycle can obtain a license plate and registration without any coverage. This is different than the law with regard to cars and trucks. The owner of either of those types of motor vehicles must, at a mimimum, have Personal Injury Protection (PIP) and Property Damage – Liability insurance to obtain a plate and registration. (PIP is no-fault coverage and can pay the policy holder and a few others up to $10,000 for medical benefits and lost wages, while PD – Liability covers property damage to the other vehicles.)

However, in the event of an accident resulting in death or personal injury, if the uninsured motorcyclist or car/truck owner with only PIP/PD is charged with causing the accident, his/her drivers license and all vehicle registrations will be suspended. Sections 316.066(3)(a)1 and 324.051(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Taking it one step further, these consequences will also result to the inadequately insured owner even if he/she was not operating the vehicle, if the accident was caused by a permissive user. This is because Florida considers vehicles used on its roads and highways to be dangerous instruments, subjecting its owners to the same liability for accidents as the permissive operators.
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