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scales of justice.jpgNot satisfied with the existing arbitrary damage caps on non-economic damages (e.g., pain & suffering) contained in Fla. Stat. 766.118 – presently under challenge in Estate of Michelle Evette McCall v. United States of America* as violating the Florida Constitution – Florida’s 2010 Republican-controlled legislature created additional barriers to the rights of individuals harmed by medical negligence.

Caps on non-economic damages for Medicaid patients. Contained in 766.118(6), Medicaid recipients harmed by medical negligence are limited to $300,000 in non-economic damages. The arbitrary cap applies regardless of the damage, including death and catastrophic injury (e.g., brain damage; paralysis).

Sovereign immunity granted to private medical schools and their employees providing services at teaching hospitals (primarily affects the University of Miami through its dealings with Jackson Memorial Hospital). The new measure is contained in F.S. 766.1115. I have blogged recently about the dangers associated with sovereign immunity – Sovereign Immunity and Florida Personal Injury Law. Sadly, the Florida Legislature has seen fit to extend the dangerous doctrine to private for-profit corporations.
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legal document.jpgTypically, Florida automobile insurance policies recognize two classes of insureds. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 238. (Fla. 1971). Class I insureds are named insureds, usually the owner of the vehicle, and their resident relatives. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren, 678 So. 2d 324, 326 n.2 (Fla. 1996) (citing Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 238; Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 710, 713 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), approved, 583 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1991); Florida Statute 627.732(4). Class II insureds are lawful occupants of an insured vehicle who are not named insureds or resident relatives of named insureds; essentially, they are “third-party beneficiaries to the named insureds’ policy. Id. Class II insureds “are insured only because they are drivers or passengers in an insured vehicle with the consent of the named insured.” Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Hurtado, 587 So. 2d 1314, 1317 (Fla. 1991) (citations omitted).
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government cut2.jpgInjured seamen are entitled to maintenance, cure, and unearned wage benefits regardless of fault. Moreover, as long as the injury or illness occurs while the seaman remains obligated to return to the vessel if called, such as when on shore leave, the benefits should be available, and because close calls concerning coverage are supposed to favor seamen, coverage has been granted under numerous other circumstances. While the no fault aspect of the law is the same as that utilized in most state workers’ compensation systems – Florida’s workers’ compensation system is located in Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes – the state systems are more conservative with regard to the extension of coverage for injuries occurring beyond the workplace.
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crushed vehicle.jpgOwners of motor vehicles registered and operated in Florida are vicariously liable for damages caused by their vehicles while operated by a consensual driver. Car rental companies are exempt from this rule.

This form of strict liability is derived from Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine, adopted in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), which is based on the proposition that motor vehicles operated on public highways are dangerous instruments and the owners who entrust them to others should be liable for injury to others caused by negligence of the persons to whom the instrumentalities are entrusted.

Until 2005, when the Bush Administration and the Republican Congress carved out an exemption, through the Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. Sec. 30106), the doctrine applied to the car rental industry. To this writer, the exemption is dangerous because it removes nearly every motivation the industry might have to know who is driving its vehicles. (See this blog for an example of what I mean: Profits Over People – The Willful Ignorance of Florida Car Rental Companies.)
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ship.jpgUnder traditional maritime law, a seaman had no cause of action against his employer for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow seaman. The Osceola, 189 U.W. 158 (1903). This harsh rule changed in 1920, when Congress passed the Jones Act, 46 USC App. Section 688, creating a negligence action for seamen against their employers.

Text of Jones Act on personal injuries and death:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.

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king.jpgSovereign Immunity derives from the medieval principle that “The King can do no wrong.” Prior to 1975, its application in Florida meant that the government could not be sued for damages caused by its wrongdoing. In that year, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statute 768.28, which allowed actions against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions (e.g., cities, municipalities, counties). However, the statute capped the amount that could be recovered, regardless of the actual damages in a case, and it allowed to stand absolute immunity for planning level decisions.

From the statute’s original enactment until July 1, 2011, a period of 36 years, the damage caps stood at $100,000 per individual, $200,000 total per claim. For example, if 4 people were catastrophically injured by the negligence of a government employee, the most any one individual could recover was $100,000, leaving the other 3 to share the remaining $100,000. (The $200,000 could also be split equally among the four or any other way, so long as any one victime did not receive more than $100,000.)

In 2009, the Florida Legislature passed a bill upping the damage caps to $200,000/$300,000 effective July 1, 2011. The increase, although far from adequate in many cases, was a long time coming and a positive step.

The statute has left untouched absolute sovereign immunity for the discretionary, judgmental, planning-level decisions of a governmental entity. Examples include decisions concerning the initial plan, road alignment, traffic control device installation, the improvement of roads and intersections, and defects in the construction of a road, median, and intersection.

However, once the sovereign becomes aware of a hazard so serious and so inconspicuous to a foreseeable plaintiff that it virtually constitutes a trap, the planning level absolute sovereign immunity is waived, bringing into play the damage caps discussed above.

Countless wars have been fought over whether planning level immunity applies or has been waived.
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burning van.jpgI have blogged here in the past that the 2011 Republican-controlled Florida Legislature seemed bound and determined to gut one of the state’s most important laws at holding vehicle manufacturers accountable for producing defective products. Although some within the legislature may have had this outcome as a goal, reasonable minds prevailed in the 2011 legislative session to the extent that the legislative body’s modifications did not eviscerate the law as many within the civil justice community had feared.

The principle of law under discussion is the crashworthiness doctrine. It stands for the proposition that vehicle manufacturers can be liable for harm caused by unsafe vehicles, even if the vehicle was put to the test by another negligent party. Kidron v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) (following Larson v. General Motors, 391 F. 2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)).

The principle was later bolstered by the holding in D’Amario v. Ford, 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001), which limited the use of comparative fault in crashworthiness cases.

In D’Amario a minor was the passenger in a vehicle that struck a tree. A fire began that ended in an explosion, causing the minor to lose three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body. The fire resulted from a defective relay switch manufactured by Ford.

The minor and his mother sued Ford for the damages resulting from the defective switch. They did not seek to recover compensation from Ford for injuries from striking the tree.

At trial, Ford sought to introduce evidence as to the cause of the initial accident, which was that another minor was intoxicated and negligently drove the vehicle into the tree. The plaintiffs (mother and son) argued that this evidence was irrelevant to the claim for damages caused by the defective switch. The trial court admitted the evidence, meaning that it allowed the jury to hear the evidence. The jury returned a verdict for Ford.

The case was appealed and made its way to the Florida Supreme Court. The court considered cases from other states and concluded that the majority view in the nation was that such impact evidence was relevant. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the minority view, ruling in favor of the catastrophically injured minor and his mother.

Before D’Amario, in crashworthiness cases jurors were allowed to hear evidence of the driver’s fault and apportion damages against the driver. This tended to direct the focus of responsibility onto the negligent driver and take it off the manufacturer whose defective product caused the enhanced injury. D’Amario eliminated the chance of such evidence distracting, confusing, or angering juries.

Not surprisingly, automobile manufacturers have been trying for ten years to reverse D’Amario. Many thought their goal would be accomplished in the 2011 legislative session. Although a measure was proposed that would have satisfied the manufacturers, amendments filed on the Senate Floor by Senator David Simmons (R) and passed by both chambers of the Legislature prevented the crashworthiness doctrine from being eliminated altogether in Florida. The bill that passed, which does modify D’Amario, revised Florida Statute 768.81.

The revised 768.81(3)(b) provides as follows:

In a products liability action alleging that injuries received by a claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the accident when apportioning fault between or among them. The jury shall be appropriately instructed by the trial judge on the apportionment of fault in products liability actions where there are allegations that the injuries received by the claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product. The rules of evidence apply to these actions.

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drunk.jpgPersonal injury cases against drunk drivers present positive opportunities for Plaintiff lawyers to seek punitive damages and recover enhanced compensatory damages (e.g., pain & suffering; lost wages).

Punitive Damages

The procedure for claiming punitive damages and the standards for holding a defendant liable for punitive damages are set forth in Florida Statute 768.72.

A claim for punitive damages may not be plead in the initial complaint. Rather, the Plaintiff must seek leave of court to amend the complaint to claim punitive damages. The judge should allow the amendment if evidence in the record or proferred by the Plaintiff provides a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So.2d 158 (Fla.1996) and F.S. 768.72(1). Contrary to the proposition often put forward by Defendants, the statute does not require an evidentiary hearing to permit the amendment. Pursuant to section 768.72, a proffer of evidence can support a trial court’s determination. Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 677 So.2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

768.72 says this about what must be shown to establish liability:

(2) A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence. As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Intentional misconduct” means that the defendant had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury or damage to the claimant would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of conduct, resulting in injury or damage.

(b) “Gross negligence” means that the defendant’s conduct was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.

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hummer.jpgFlorida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes vicarious responsibility upon the owner or other possessor of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts it to another for any subsequent negligent operation which injures a member of the traveling public. Jackson v. Hertz Corporation, 590 So.2d 929, 937. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1990); Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1959); Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917).
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scales of justice.jpgIn its infinite, albeit, less than perfect wisdom, American jurisprudence places on the party asserting a claim the burden of proving the claim. In criminal and civil cases, the proponent must, to use a sports analogy, outscore the opponent in order to win. A tie or less is never a victory but often a defeat. The standard in Florida workers’ compensation cases may be an exception to the rule.

Everyone is familiar with the standard of proof in criminal cases. For a defendant to be convicted, the prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond and to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt. In college football terms, this is the equivalent of a 63-10 pasting.

This is an extremely high standard, as well it should be.

The burden of proof is not nearly as high In civil cases (e.g, personal injury; medical malpractice; premises liability). Nevertheless, the proponent (i.e., Plaintiff; Claimant; Petitioner) maintains the burden of presenting evidence that tips the scale in his or her favor, i.e., the weight of the evidence must favor the proponent by at least 51%. The standard is described in Florida Standard Jury Instruction 401.3 GREATER WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE as follows:

“Greater weight of the evidence” means the more persuasive and convincing force and effect of the entire evidence in the case.

Instead of a 63-10 shellacking, a last second field goal for a 1 point victory will do the job.
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